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Abstract 
Mancur Olson and Robert Putnam provide two conflicting views on the effect of involvement with 
voluntary associations on their members. Putnam argues that associations instill in their members habits of 
cooperation, solidarity and public spiritedness. Olson emphasizes the tendency of groups to pursue private 
interests and lobby for preferential policies. We carry out the first field experiment involving a sample of 
members of different association types from different age groups and education levels, as well as a 
demographically comparable sample of non-members. This enables us to examine the differential patterns 
of behavior followed by members of Putnam-type and Olson-type associations. Coherently with both the 
Putnam’s and Olson’s view, we find that members of Putnam-type (Olson-type) associations display more 
(no more) generalized trust than non-members. However, when we examine trustworthy behavior we find 
the opposite pattern, with members of Olson-type (Putnam-type) associations more (no more) trustworthy 
than non-members. No relevant effect for the intensity of participation in associations emerges. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of groups in shaping individuals preferences and modes of behavior has attracted the attention of 
many scholars in the social sciences. Two main theories on the relationship between groups and individuals 
are contrasted in contemporary investigations. The first is due to Robert Putnam. Drawing on Tocqueville’s 
(1840) seminal analysis, Putnam posits that “associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, 
solidarity and public-spiritedness” (Putnam et al., 1993: 89-90). The second theory is due to Mancur Olson 
(1965; 1982). Putnam’s optimism on the beneficial role of associations is here replaced by a disenchanted 
view of the underlying reasons for the existence of associations. Olson emphasizes the tendency of groups 
to pursue private interests and lobby for preferential policies. Far from instilling public-spiritedness in the 
society, parochial and partisan interests prevail in the associations’ objectives.  
These two views are not necessarily irreconcilable. It has been argued that voluntary associations differ in 
characteristics and purposes. Some types of associations may operate in accordance with Putnam’s theory, 
other with Olson’s. In their seminal contribution, Knack and Keefer (1997) classify trade unions, political 
parties or groups, and professional associations as “Olson-type” associations, as these associations are 
“most representative of groups with redistributive goals” (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1273). “Redistributive” 
here is synonym with rent-seeking behavior. The objective of these associations is mainly to redirect 
society’s resources to the benefit of the association members. Education, arts, music or cultural activities; 
religious or church organizations; and youth work (e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.) are defined as 
“Putnam-type” associations. They are “identified as those groups least likely to act as “distributional 
coalitions” but which involve social interactions that can build trust and cooperative habits” (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997: 1273).  
The previous study, along with other contributions  drawing on aggregate country-level data in order to 
study the effect of associational membership (see section 2 for a review), cannot take into account either 
the possibility that individuals are members of more than one type of association, or the intensity of their 
associational activity. Other studies, reviewed in section 2, analyze the effect of associational membership 
using individual-level surveys (Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Stolle, 1998; Wollebaek and Selle, 2002). Although 
these contributions are better able to investigate the micro-mechanisms of the relationship between pro-
sociality and membership in voluntary associations, the possibility of confounding effects and misreporting 
that is intrinsic in survey questions hamper their conclusions (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Anderson et al., 2004). Moreover, the use of survey questions on trust has raised much 
criticism. As Glaeser et al. (2000: 800) put it, “While these survey questions are interesting, they are also 
vague, abstract, and hard to interpret”. 
In this paper we revert to an experimental analysis to examine the differential patterns of behavior 
followed by members of Putnam-type and Olson-type associations. We carry out the first field experiment 
involving a sample of members of different association types from different age groups and education 
levels, as well as a demographically comparable sample of non-members. We investigate the level of 
generalized trust (towards people from the general population) and particularized trust (trust towards 
fellow members)
1
, of members of Putnam-type, Olson-type and other types of association within a Trust 
Game (Berg et al., 1994).  
                                                        
1
 Generalized trust may be interpreted as a general predisposition toward other people, especially people whom one does not 
know (Uslaner, 2002) and may be defined as “a trust that goes beyond the boundaries of kinship and friendship and even beyond 
the boundaries of acquaintance” (Stolle and Rochon, 1998: 48). It differs from the notion of particularized trust which consists in 
 4 
First of all, our analysis aims at testing four main hypotheses inspired by the Putnam’s and Olson’s 
approaches that we will call PUTNAM HYPOTHESES (A and B) and OLSON HYPOTESES (A and B): 
1) PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS A: Members of Putnam-type associations display more trust towards the 
general public (i.e. generalized trust) than non-members; 
2) PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS B: The level of trust toward their own association members is higher than 
the level of trust towards the general public for members of Putnam-type associations; that is, 
particularized trust is higher than generalized trust; 
3) OLSON HYPOTHESIS A: Members of Olson-type associations do not show higher levels of 
generalized trust than non-members; 
4) OLSON HYPOTHESIS B: Members of Olson-type associations display more particularized than 
generalized trust. 
The two “B Hypotheses”, i.e. that interaction within associations are characterized by higher level of trust 
than interactions between association members and strangers, are based on the concept of direct and 
indirect reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Seinen and Schram, 2006; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). 
Social networks generated through the association trigger mechanisms based on reciprocity, reputation, 
monitoring and sanctioning that increase cooperation among members of the same group (Putnam et al., 
1993; Putnam, 2000; Paxton, 2007). Indeed, we should observe members of associations to trust fellow 
members more than people from the general public regardless of association types.  
However, Putnam and other followers of the Tocquevillian tradition argue that participation in associations 
also fosters pro-social attitudes in interactions with generalised others in the society at large, that is, 
outside the association. This may be in part explained by the very fact that associations increase the density 
and the overlap of social networks, as this activates the mechanisms based on reciprocity, reputation, 
monitoring and sanctioning mentioned above. Nevertheless, in large part, this is also based on the 
conjecture that associational membership will work towards increasing trust in, and co-operation with, 
absolute strangers (Putnam et al., 1993; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Putnam, 2000; 
Wollebaek and Selle, 2002). From this approach we derive our PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS A.  
Conversely, Olson’s view (1965; 1982) hinges upon the role of associations in pursuing private interests of 
members and in relegating the general public interest to a minor role. From this perspective, we expect 
associations not to affect positively generalized trust (OLSON HYPOTHESIS A). 
Secondly, not only does the Trust Game allow us to analyze Putnam-type and Olson-type members’ 
patterns of trusting behavior, but also it enables us to study their trustworthiness.
2
 Our study is the first to 
tackle the issue of trustworthiness in relation to different types of association.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
relying only on people who belong to one’s own “moral community” and share the same characteristics (Uslaner, 2002). Berggren 
and Jordahl (2006: 143) distinguish between particularized trust and generalized trust where “the former entails trusting people 
you know or know something about; the latter trusting most (but not all) people you do not know or know anything about”. In this 
perspective, the notion of knowledge-based trust (Yamigishi and Yamigishi, 1994) clarifies that particularized trust is strictly related 
to the available information. 
2
 We are aware that different motivational drivers may lead subjects’ decisions in Trust Games (e.g. Becchetti and Degli Antoni, 
2010). In particular, subjects may be motivated by other regarding preferences (Cox, 2004), altruistic or inequality-averse 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), social-welfare preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), warm glow (Andreoni, 1989; 1990) 
and trust (only on the part of the first mover) or reciprocity (only on the part of the second mover). We are not able, neither is it an 
aim of our analysis, to disentangle among the different motivations behind subjects’ decision in our Trust Game. We simply assume 
that a higher amount sent by the Sender and a higher share returned by the Receiver are representative of a greater propensity to 
cooperate. In what follows, we generically refer to trust and trustworthiness when talking about Senders’ and Receivers’ behavior. 
 5 
Finally, we also examine whether increasing one’s involvement with associations affects the behavior of 
members of different types of associations in our Trust Game. For this purpose we analyze the impact of 
the number of associations that an individual has joined and the number of hours that individuals report as 
spending in associational meetings and activities every week.  
We investigate the previous issues by randomizing our sample into an in-group and an out-group 
treatment. In the in-group treatment association members are paired with people from their own 
association. In the out-group treatment they are paired with people from the general population. Behavior 
in the in-group and out-group treatments gives us a measure of particularized and generalized trust, 
respectively. The comparison with the behavior of people from the general population also enables us to 
contrast generalized trust by members and non-members. 
We follow Knack and Keefer’s (1997) classification of Olson-type and Putnam-type associations. We involve 
in our experiment members of trade unions and cultural associations (see section 3). These are 
representative of the former and latter group, respectively. We also examine the behavior of members of 
social welfare and health services associations, which we call “Residual” associations, as they are not 
included in either category in the original Knack and Keefer’s (1997) classification. 
Both the PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS A and the OLSON HYPOTHESIS A are confirmed by our experimental 
evidence. Members of Putnam-type associations trust people from the general population more than non-
members (PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS A). Members of Olson-type associations treat people from the general 
population in the same way as non-members (OLSON HYPOTHESIS A). With respect to the “B hypotheses”, 
no in-group effect emerges with respect to members of Putnam-type associations, i.e. they trust fellow 
members as they trust people from the general population. That is, PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS B is not 
supported by our evidence. Conversely, the level of particularized trust of members of Olson-type 
associations towards fellow members is higher than generalized trust towards general others. This supports 
OLSON HYPOTHESIS B.  
As far as Residual associations are concerned, their members show patterns of trusting behavior in our 
experiments that are alike members of Putnam-type associations’ both toward generalized others and 
fellow members.  
The analysis of receivers’ decisions brings about a surprising result. In this case members of Olson-type 
associations return significantly more than people from the general public, both when they are matched 
with fellow Olson-type members, and when they interact with people from the general public. The same 
pattern occurs for Residual association members who also show in-group favoritism, i.e. they return more 
to their fellow members than to people from the general public. By contrast, Putnam-type association 
members are no more trustworthy than people from the general public, either in the in-group, or in the 
out-group treatment. 
Finally, we find a negative effect of the number of hours spent volunteering in the associations on trusting 
behavior of members of Olson-type association when paired with people from the general public. No other 
effect of the intensity of participation emerges. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on the relationship between 
association membership and trust. Section 3 summarizes the experimental design and describes our 
sample. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and the econometric analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Related literature on the relationship between association membership and trust 
In their cross-country survey analysis, Knack and Keefer (1997) find a negative, albeit insignificant, effect of 
Putnam-type associations on generalized trust and a positive effect of Olson-type associations. They also 
find that Olson-type (Putnam-type) associations are positively (negatively) associated with an index of civic 
attitude. Knack (2003) uses larger country coverage than Knack and Keefer (1997) and finds a positive 
effect of Putnam-type associations on generalized trust, while the effect of Olson-type associations is 
insignificant
3
. Other studies have used individual-level data to analyze the relationship between generalized 
trust and association membership distinguishing between different types of associations. Stolle and Rochon 
(1998) show that in 76.5% of the cultural associations they survey
4
, which are Putnam-type in character,  
members score significantly higher than non-members in an index based on questions on trust in others 
and on the frequency of interactions with neighbors, e.g. to borrow money or other items. They also find 
that members of as few as 30% of Olson-type associations
5
 display higher levels of the previous index than 
non-members. Finally, as far as Residual associations are concerned, Stolle and Rochon (1998) find that 
52.6% of Community groups’ members and 57.9% of Private interest groups’ members show higher levels 
of the index than non-members
6
.  Wollebaek and Selle (2002) find that the percentage of respondents who 
say that “Most people can be trusted” is higher among members of Putnam-type associations (culture and 
recreational associations - 68% - and religious - 73%) and of Olson-type associations (parties and unions - 
77%) than among non-affiliated (54%). However, the association type is not significant in explaining the 
presence of trustful members once multiple affiliations are considered as a control variable in a 
multivariate regression analysis. Stolle (1998) presents descriptive evidence detailing a higher level of 
generalized trust, measured through a set of trust questions, for members of sport associations and church 
choirs (Putnam-type association type) in comparison with customers of a commercial gymnasium. The 
latter are involved in activities similar to those of association members, but know each other less and spend 
less time together after joining the activity than association members. 
Our study is innovative with respect to the existing literature because of its experimental character. This 
allows us to investigate the relationship between association membership and trust by using an 
experimental measure of trust and by taking into account both multiple membership and the effect of 
intensity of participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 Knack (2003) adopts the same classification used by Knack and Keefer (1997) with regard to Olson-type associations, while 
religious or church organizations are dropped from the Putnam-type associations where sport or recreation associations and local 
community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality are included.  
4
 According to Stolle and Rochon’s classification, cultural associations include: associations for the preservation of traditional 
regional, national, or ethnic culture; church groups; literary, music, and art society. Members of this association type appear also to 
be characterized be high scores in indexes of Political Action, Political Trust and Optimism, Tolerance and Free-ridership (Stolle and 
Rochon, 1998). 
5
They consider economic associations that include unions, employers’ associations, professional associations, agricultural 
associations, consumer groups, cooperatives, shareholders’ organizations. Members of this association type appear also to be 
characterized be high values of indices of Political Action and Political Trust.  
6
 Community groups include: local actions groups, resident’s associations, service and welfare organizations, health care groups, 
parents’ associations, voluntary defense associations. Members of this association type seem to be also characterized be high 
values of indices of Political Action, Political Trust and Optimism, Tolerance and Free-ridership. Private interests groups include: 
sport, outdoor, youth, hobby, and auto. Members of this association type appear also to be characterized be high values of indices 
of Political Action, Political Trust and Optimism, Tolerance and Free-ridership. 
 7 
3. Experimental design and sample 
In our Trust Game experiment both senders and receivers are endowed with 25 euro (€). The sender is the 
first player to move. She has to decide how much of her initial endowment to send to the receiver, in 
multiples of 5€. Therefore six transfer levels are possible (0, 5, 10, 15, 20 or 25€). The amount sent is 
doubled by the experimenter. The receiver has to decide how much of the amount in her possession after 
the sender’s choice - i.e. the initial 25€, plus the amount sent by the sender and doubled by the 
experimenter - to send back to the first mover. We adopted the strategy method, so receivers had to 
indicate the amount they would like to return for each of the possible six options available to the sender.  
The experiment was conducted between May and October 2011 at the University of Parma library. 
Recruited subjects were randomly assigned to two different groups prior to the session, and were 
summoned to two meeting points of the university. We took care that the two groups did not meet each 
other while they were conducted to two different rooms of the library. All sessions were run in parallel in 
the two rooms by the two researchers, following an identical script.  
All subjects took two decisions, the first one as senders and the second one as receivers. When they took 
the first decision as senders, subjects did not know that they would have taken the second decision as 
receivers. Subjects present in one room were told that they would have been matched anonymously with 
another subject present in the other room. Pairs were changed after the first decision and no feedback was 
given at the end of each choice, so we consider the two choices as independent. Subjects were paid only 
for one decision, each of them having 50% probability of being drawn. 
After the two experimental decisions, we elicited subjects’ beliefs over sender and receiver behavior and 
we administered the post-experiment questionnaire. Payments were distributed in cash at the end of the 
session.  
Sessions lasted on average 75 minutes. The average payoff was 31.7 euro (std. dev. 11.99).  
374 subjects took part in the experiment. 263 subjects were formally affiliated to a voluntary association, 
and attended meetings for at least one hour per month (“members” henceforth). They were recruited by 
the experimenters in ten different associations operating in the Province of Parma. Four were cultural 
associations (one ethnic and traditional dance association and three choirs). Following Knack and Keefer 
(1997), we classify them as Putnam-type associations. Two of the associations were trade unions, which we 
classify as Olson-type associations. Four associations were social welfare and health services associations 
(an association assisting hospitalized children, an association for medical research on cancer, the Italian 
association for blood donation and an association dedicated to charity and evangelization), which we 
classify as Residual associations.  
111 participants were not formally affiliated at the time the research was conducted (“non-members” 
henceforth). 77 non-members had never been members in the past, while 34 non-members had been 
members of associations in the past but not at the moment of the experiment (dropouts). Since we never 
find differences between these two latter groups (see also Degli Antoni and Grimalda, 2013) we treat them 
as a single category in the rest of the analysis. Non-members were recruited by Demoskopea, one of the 
most well-known opinion polls and market research agency in Italy
7
. Contact with potential subjects was 
carried out in person by experimenters through announcements at association meetings and over the 
phone by Demoskopea staff. In spite of the different type of contact we requested that all announcements 
with potential subjects were made following an identical recruitment script. In this way, potential subjects 
were given exactly the same information prior to coming to the research sessions. 
                                                        
7
 Four non-members were recruited by the experimenters to make up for no-shows. 
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3.1. The in-group treatment sample 
 
109 members took part in the in-group treatment. Table 1 reports the number of subjects from each 
association type. 
Table 1 - Number of subjects per association type “in-group” 
 In-group 
Putnam-type 38 
Olson-type 30 
Residual 41 
 
In the in-group treatment subjects were informed that they were paired with a member of the same 
association from which they had been contacted by the experimenters and that this subject was taking part 
to the session in the other room.
 
The instructions read: “The person with whom you will be paired is a 
member of the Association ‘X’ of which you are also a member, and is resident in Parma, or its province, or 
in neighbouring provinces. He was asked to take part in the research in a similar way to how you have been 
contacted” (‘X’ was the name of the association). 
 
3.2. The out-group treatment sample 
 
265 subjects took part in the out-group treatment. They included all the 111 non-members and the 
remaining 154 members. Members were recruited by the experimenters in the same ten associations 
mentioned above except for 11 members who were recruited by Demoskopea
8
.  
We operate a finer distinction in the out-group treatment than in the in-group with respect to assignment 
to association types. While in the in-group treatment we only take into account the association where 
subjects had been recruited, we consider all associations of which a person is a member for our analyses 
relative of the out-group treatment. This yields seven mutually exclusive categories: (1) People belonging to 
one type of association only – namely, people belonging to just Putnam-type associations (which we call 
“Putnam-type only” henceforth); or (2) just Olson-type associations (“Olson-type only” henceforth); or (3) 
just Residual associations (“Residual only” henceforth) – namely, people belonging to two types of 
associations; or (4) people belonging to Putnam-type and Olson-type associations (“Putnam-type & Olson-
type” henceforth); or (5) to Putnam-type and Residual-type associations (“Putnam-type & Residual” 
henceforth); or (6) Olson-type and Residual-type associations (“Olson-type & Residual” henceforth); finally, 
(7) people belonging to all three types of association (“All types” henceforth).  
The reason why we operate this finer distinction in the out-group treatment and not in the in-group is that 
in the latter treatment we only measure particularized trust, which strictly depends on the association 
where subjects have been recruited. In fact, members recruited from an association in the in-group 
                                                        
8
 We had asked Demoskopea to recruit only non-members or dropouts. However, during the recruitment interview with 
Demoskopea, 11 subjects answered negatively to the screening question on whether a person is part of an association but they 
reported in the post-experiment questionnaire that they actually were association members. We suppose that this may be due to 
subjects’ absent-mindedness when answering the recruitment interview, so we have decided to keep these 11 subjects in the 
sample as members. They have been classified as belonging to “other associations” 
 
 9 
treatment are paired with other members belonging to that same association. Conversely, generalized trust 
measured in the out-group treatment may be affected not only by membership in the association from 
where subjects were recruited, but also by the other different types of association where subjects were 
active.  
Table 2 summarizes the size of association membership per type of association in the out-group treatment.  
 
Table 2 - Number of subjects per association type “out-group” 
 Out-group 
Non-members 111 
Putnam-type Only 29 
Olson-type Only 30 
Residual Only 34 
Putnam & Olson-type 12 
Putnam & Residual-type 25 
Olson & Residual-type 12 
All Types   11 
 
 
The script in the out-group treatment read that more than a thousand people of different age and socio-
economic conditions residents in the province of Parma and surrounding provinces had been contacted. 
Sessions in the out-group treatment comprised members coming from many different types of association, 
so most of the people part of this group would, with high probability, not be acquainted with each other.
 
In 
the post-experiment questionnaire we asked subjects to state whether they thought they knew personally 
persons present in the other room. Around 7% (41%) of members participating in the out-group (in-group) 
treatment answered positively to such question. This difference is statistically significant (P<0.001; Mann-
Whitney test).  
 
3.3. Sample properties 
 
We test for the demographic comparability between the various member groups and non-member groups 
across the two treatments with Chi square and Wilcoxon non-parametric tests. We find two significant 
differences (Table 3). They concern the number of subjects who attained high-school diploma as their 
highest educational achievement among members of Residual associations in the two different treatments, 
and the satisfaction with personal financial situation as declared by the respondent between members and 
non-members. The latter is used as a proxy for the subject’s economic condition. The econometric analysis 
will control for these differences. 
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Table 3 - Balancing properties per experimental condition and type of association 
 Age Female Bachelor’s_degree Secondary_school Income 
satisfaction 
H0: Non-member = 
Members 
1.522 
(0.128) 
0.0278 
(0.868) 
0.1840 
(0.668) 
1.4063 
(0.236) 
-2.941 
(0.0033) 
H0: Members of 
Putnam-type 
associations (in-
group) = Members of 
Putnam-type 
associations (out-
group) 
-1.008 
(0.313) 
0.1757 
(0.675) 
1.3271 
(0.249) 
0.2219 
(0.638) 
0.0341 
(0.854) 
H0: Members of 
Olson-type 
associations (in-
group) = Members of 
Olson-type 
associations (out-
group) 
-0.243 
(0.8081) 
2.0142 
(0.156) 
0.7629 
(0.382) 
2.5124 
(0.113) 
0.0770 
(0.781) 
H0: Members of 
Residual associations 
(in-group) = Members 
of Residual 
associations (out-
group) 
1.683 
(0.0924) 
0.0049 
(0.944) 
1.2018 
(0.273) 
4.3787 
(0.036) 
0.0308 
(0.8861) 
*For continuous variables we tested - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences by using the Mann-Whitney 
test. For dichotomous variables we used the Chi square test to analyze the differences in proportions. P-value in squared brackets. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Drawing on the same dataset used in this paper, Degli Antoni and Grimalda (2013) show that members 
send and return significantly more than non-members. The novelty of the present paper is to show that 
significant differences do emerge in this general pattern when we distinguish between Putnam-type, Olson-
type and Residual associations. Tables 4 and 5 summarize descriptive statistics across treatment and per 
association type for the amount sent and the return rate respectively. 
As far as the amount sent is considered (Table 4), descriptive statistics seem to reveal two main patterns, 
which are also confirmed by non-parametric tests:  
1) Members of associations contribute significantly more than non-members in the out-group 
treatment in all cases but two. In both cases Olson-type associations are involved. Such are 
members of both Putnam-type and Olson-type associations (Mann-Whitney p=0.3266) and 
members of both Olson-type and Residual associations (Mann-Whitney p=0.8546)
9
.  
 
                                                        
9
 Differences between non-members and members of other combinations of associations as reported in Table 4 are always 
significant at the 5% level except when we consider members of Putnam-type, Olson-type and Residual where the level of 
significance is at the 10% level. The tests are available upon request. 
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2) No difference emerges between the in-group and the out-group treatment in the amount sent by 
members of Putnam-type (Mann-Whitney p=0.5741), Olson-type (Mann-Whitney p=0.5147) and 
Residual (Mann-Whitney p=0.9125) associations. In order to analyze the existence of in-group/out-
group effects we compare the difference in amounts sent for in-group members and out-group 
members who belong to strictly one association type. 
 
Table 4 - Amount sent across treatment and association membership 
 Out-group In-group 
 Median Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
Non-members 10 10.496 
(6.973) 
  
Members of Putnam-type only 15 15.172 
(5.587) 
15 14.342 
(5.947) 
Members of Olson-type only 15 14.5 
(6.345) 
15 15.833 
(6.833) 
Members of Residual only 15 15.441 
(6.783) 
15 15.610 
(5.612) 
Members of Putnam-type and Olson-type 12.5 12.917 
(7.821) 
  
Members of Putnam-type and Residual 15 14.8 
(6.994) 
  
Members of Olson-type and Residual 10 11.25 
(6.440) 
  
Members of Putnam-type, Olson-type and 
Residual (All types) 
15 14.091 
(5.394) 
  
Members of at least one Putnam-type 
association  
15 14.545 
(6.344) 
  
Members of at least one Olson-type 
association 
15 13.538 
(6.479) 
  
Members of at least one Residual 
association 
15 14.451 
(6.667) 
  
Members of at least one X association identifies subjects who are members of at least one association of type X. For instance, 
members of at least one Olson-type association includes members of: Olson-type only; Putnam-type and Olson-type; Olson-type 
and Residual; All types. 
 
As far as the amount returned is considered (Table 5 – we consider the average return rate on the six 
possible transfer rates available to the receiver in our Trust Game), descriptive statistics and non-
parametric tests reveal that: 
1. Members of all the different types of associations seem to return significantly more than non-
members (this is also clearly shown in Figure 1). The statistical significance is stronger for members 
of Olson-type only associations (Mann-Whitney p=0.0025) and members of Residual-type only 
(Mann-Whitney p=0.0054) than for members of Putnam-type only (Mann-Whitney p=0.0256) 
associations. When we consider multiple associations versus non-membership, statistically 
significant differences emerge with respect to members of Putnam-type and Residual (Mann-
Whitney p=0.0199), at least one Putnam-type association (Mann-Whitney p=0.0029), at least one 
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Olson-type association (Mann-Whitney p=0.0016) and at least one Residual association (Mann-
Whitney p=0.0006).  
2. No difference emerges between the in-group and the out-group treatment in the amount returned 
by members of Putnam-type (Mann-Whitney p=0.5145), Olson-type (Mann-Whitney p=0.7956) and 
Residual (Mann-Whitney p=0.1115) associations. 
 
Table 5 - Return rate across treatment and association membership (average on six possible transfer rates)* 
 Out-group In-group 
 Median Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
Non-members 0.219 0.243 
(0.180) 
  
Members of Putnam-type only 0.282 
 
0.301 
(0.146) 
0.285 0.277 
(0.106) 
Members of Olson-type only 0.295 0.349 
(0.185) 
0.319 0.331 
(0.169) 
Members of Residual only 0.318 0.313 
(0.151) 
0.331 0.398 
(0.207) 
Members of Putnam-type and Olson-type 0.261 0.282 
(0.133) 
  
Members of Putnam-type and Residual 0.300 0.303 
(0.119) 
  
Members of Olson-type and Residual 0.299 0.278 
(0.082) 
  
Members of Putnam-type, Olson-type and 
Residual (All types) 
0.282 0.339 
(0.229) 
  
Members of at least one Putnam-type 
association  
0.282 0.304 
(0.149) 
  
Members of at least one Olson-type 
association 
0.295 0.322 
(0.170) 
  
Members of at least one Residual 
association 
0.298 0.308 
(0.146) 
  
*In this table we consider the average return rate on the six possible transfer rates. Members of at least one X association identifies 
subjects who are members of at least one association of type X. For instance, members of at least one Olson-type association 
includes members of: Olson-type only; Putnam-type and Olson-type; Olson-type and Residual; All types. 
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Figure 1 - Return share across treatment and association membership distinguishing between members of 
different types of associations and non-members 
Association members and non-members return share in 
out-group treatment 
Association members return share in in-group treatment 
(and non-members in out-group treatment) 
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4.2  Econometric analysis 
In order to investigate the differences in choices by senders in consideration of their associational 
condition, we perform Ordered Logit estimates on the amount sent, which could vary between 0€ and 25€ 
in multiples of 5€. We define Amount sent* a sender’s unobservable willingness to trust others, modelled 
as a function of a vector of independent variables. The mapping between Amount sent* and the variable 
we observe in the experiment, Amount sent, is then given by:  
  Amount senti*=α+G’i β+X’iδ +εi       (1) 
  Amount senti=k if mk-1< Amount senti*≤mk, k=0,...,K     (2) 
α is a constant term. The index i denotes the individual. Gi is a vector which includes dummy variables 
identifying the types of association to which subjects belong. Variables included in vector Gi change across 
different specifications and are described in detail below. Xi is a vector including a wide array of control 
variables. It includes socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, education, occupational 
condition, satisfaction with health and income, the propensity to take financial risk and controls connected 
with the experimental conditions, namely, a dummy identifying the two experimenters who led the 
sessions in two different rooms and the number of errors in the comprehension questions. Finally, the 
vector Xi also includes a dummy variable identifying dropouts, which is never different from other non-
members. The description of these variables is reported in Appendix A. β and δ are vectors of parameters 
of interest, and εi is the error term, assumed to be distributed according to a standardised Logistic 
distribution εi ~Logistic(0,1). The index k represents the discrete possible amounts sent and K the total 
number of categories. In our experiment, K=6. mk are the (unobservable) cutoff points in the domain of 
Amount senti* at which the individual desires to switch to a higher Amount senti. We make the usual 
normalisation, m-1=- ∞ , m0=0, and mk=+ ∞ . 
In order to investigate the effect of associational membership on receivers’ decision, we fit a Tobit model 
where the dependent variable is the return rate. The receiver could return any amount ranging from zero 
up to a maximum given by the sum of the receiver’s initial endowment (25€) and twice the amount sent to 
her by the sender. Returns were allowed up to the first decimal digit. We normalize this variable to the 
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[0,1] interval by dividing it by the maximum possible amount that receivers may send back. We call this 
variable Return rate. 
The econometric analysis of the Return rate is based on the following Tobit model with random effects: 
Return ratei*=γ0 + γ1 Amount sentj+ γ2 (Amount sentj)
2 
+ G’i β+X’iδ + ϑi + θai    (3) 
 
        1    if Return ratei* ≥  1 
Return ratei=   Return ratei*   if 0 <Return ratei*< 1    (4) 
     0    if Return ratei* ≤ 0 
 
Eq. (3) describes an individual’s latent propensity to send back to the sender a share of the money in her 
possession. This is modelled as a function of Amount sentj (where the index j indicates the individual with 
which individual i is paired). Gi and Xi includes the same variables of interest and control variables used in 
the Ordered Logit estimates. β and δ denote vectors of parameters. Finally, ϑi and θai are an individual-
specific and an idiosyncratic error term, respectively. The quadratic form in Amount sentj is added to 
capture possible non-linearities in the way receivers respond to the amount received (Bellemare and 
Kröger, 2007). Eq. (4) presents the censoring rules that force receiver with either extremely high or 
extremely low propensity to send back money to return a rate of one or zero, respectively, with positive 
probability.  
First, we examine whether members of different types of associations showed different patterns of 
behavior in relation to non-members in the in-group treatment (Table 6, column 1). Amounts sent by 
members are significantly higher than the amounts sent by non-members when members interact with 
fellow members for any of the three association types (Putnam-type_Ing; Olson-type_Ing and Residual_Ing; 
p<0.01 in all three cases - Table 6, column 1). When association members interact with people from the 
general population in the out-group treatment, we find that people who are member of only Olson-type 
associations (Olson-type_Only_Out) do not show any significant difference in their amount sent in 
comparison with non-members (p=0.116 - Table 6, column 1). On the contrary, both members of only 
Putnam-type associations (Putnam-type_Only_Out) and only Residual associations (Residual_Only_Out) do 
show significantly higher amount sent than non-members (p=0.020 for Putnam-type associations; p=0.010 
for Residual associations - Table 6, column 1). Interestingly enough, people who are members of both 
Putnam-type and Residual associations (Putnam-type_&_Residual_Out) send significantly higher amounts 
than non-members (p=0.011), while in cases in which individuals are involved with two associations and 
one of them is Olson-type (Putnam-type_&_Olson-type_out, Olson-type_&_Residual_out), their amount 
sent is not significantly different from non-members (Table 6, column 1). When we consider members of all 
association types (All_Types_Out) we find that they send more than non-members, but only at a weak level 
of significance (p=0.093). We conclude:  
Result 1: Previous evidence support both the PUTNAM HYPOTHESIS A, according to which members of 
Putnam-type associations are expected to show higher level of generalized trust than non-members, and 
the OLSON HYPOTHESIS A, according to which members of Olson-type associations are not expected to be 
endowed with higher generalized trust than non-members.  
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Second, we test for in-group favoritism for each of the association types. We start comparing the difference 
in the amount sent for in-group members and out-group members who belong to strictly one association 
type (Table 6, column 1). These three tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients for all 
three association types, even though the level of significance for members of Olson-type associations is not 
far from 10% (p=0.673 for Putnam-type; p=0.252 for Residual associations; p=0.110 for Olson-type 
associations). The failure to reject the null for the in-group effect may be caused by the regression 
coefficients being estimated with less precision due to the increased number of categories used to control 
for multiple membership in the out-group treatment. For this reason we run three further regressions 
where we introduce a dummy identifying all cases in which a subject is a member of at least one certain 
type of association. For instance, the dummy At_Least_One_Putnam-type_Out includes the four categories 
formed by: {Putnam-type_Only_Out; Olson-type_&_Putnam-type_Out; Putnam-type_&_Residuals_Out; 
All_Types_Out}. We also run analogous regressions using At_Least_One_Residual_Out (Table 6, column 3) 
and At_Least_One_Olson-type_Out (Table 6, column 4). Note that the previous result 1 holds when we use 
members of “at least one type of association” instead of strictly one type of association. When we consider 
members of at least one Olson-type association, the difference between sending directed to fellow 
members and sending towards the general population by people who are member of at least one Olson-
type association is strongly significant (p=0.006) (Table 6, column 4). Members of at least one Residual 
association show in-group favoritism only at weak levels of significance (p=0.063) (Table 6, column 3), but 
no effect emerges for Putnam-type associations (p=0.850) (Table 6, column 2). We conclude: 
Result 2: The comparison between behavior in the in-group and out-group treatments seems to support 
only the OLSON HYPOTHESIS B: members of Olson-type associations reveal higher levels of particularized 
trust than generalized trust. By contrast we find that members of Putnam-type associations do not. 
With respect to the effect of socio-demographic controls on the amount sent, we find: a) a non-linear 
effect of the participant’s age; b) that women send significantly less than men; c) that dissatisfaction with 
one’s income has a negative effect on the amount sent; d) that people born in the South of Italy send less 
than people born in other areas; e) people who declare to believe in God, rather than being agnostic or 
atheists, send significantly less than others. 
When we look at return rates across association types, we find that members of both Residual and Olson-
type associations return significantly more than non-members, both when they are matched with fellow 
members (Residual_Ing p=0.001 and Olson-type_Ing, p=0.022, Table 6, column 5), and when they interact 
with people from the general population (Residual_Only_Out p=0.044 and Olson-type_Only_Out p=0.013 - 
Table 6, column 5). Perhaps surprisingly, Putnam-type association members are no more trustworthy than 
non-members, either in the in-group (Putnam-type_Ing, p=0.294), or in the out-group treatment (Putnam-
type_Only_Out, p=0.582). The same results hold if we use members of “at least one type of association” 
instead of strictly one type of association.  
Only Residual association members show some significant differences in behavior between the in-group 
and out-group treatment. This is the case both when members of strictly Residual associations are 
considered (p=0.088 – Table 6, column 5) and when members of at least one Residual associations are 
considered (p=0.021 Table 6, column 8). With respect to our third research question, namely, how 
members of different types of association behave when acting in response to a previous decision by 
another (trusting) subject, we conclude that: 
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Result 3: Members of Residual and Olson-type associations result as more trustworthy than non-members 
both in the in-group and the out-group treatment, while Putnam-type association members’ return rates 
are indistinguishable from non-members; in-group favouritism only emerges for Residual association 
members. 
Among the controls, we find a non-linear effect of the amount received by the sender; that people born in 
the South and retired persons return significantly less; a negative effect of the number of family members. 
We also find a positive effect of the numbers of mistakes in the experiment comprehension test.
10
 We then 
explored possible differences in the effect of mistakes on the amount returned between the different 
association types. For this purpose we interact mistakes with each single dummy variable identifying the 
different association types (Table 6, column 6). Since the F-test on the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of these interaction terms were jointly equal to 0 is not rejected (p=0.6399), we conclude that no significant 
differences emerged in the way mistakes affect our dependent variable across groups of members. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10
 The Mistakes variable measures the number of mistakes in the 6-question comprehension quiz administered after the 
instructions. We preferred not to ask subjects to re-answer the questions in case of mistakes in the comprehension quiz, because 
we thought this would have conveyed the impression that subjects had “to pass an exam” to qualify for the experiment. This would 
have likely sounded unnatural and stressful for many subjects. We preferred to collect subjects’ answers, and use the number of 
mistakes in the quizzes as a covariate in the econometric analysis. 
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Table 6 - Analysis of amounts sent and return rates: effects of association type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Amount sent Amount sent Amount sent Amount sent Return rate Return rate Return rate Return rate 
Model Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Putnam-type_Ing 1.041*** 0.966** 1.000*** 1.027*** 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.042 
 (0.386) (0.379) (0.381) (0.381) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) 
Residual_Ing 1.754*** 1.678*** 1.668*** 1.711*** 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 
 (0.430) (0.426) (0.421) (0.426) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) 
Olson-type_Ing 1.767*** 1.826*** 1.789*** 1.746*** 0.114** 0.115** 0.115** 0.110** 
 (0.488) (0.483) (0.486) (0.486) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
Putnam-type_Only_Out 1.272**  1.248** 1.287** 0.029  0.028 0.035 
 (0.547)  (0.536) (0.541) (0.053)  (0.050) (0.053) 
Residual_Only_Out 1.202** 1.151**  1.182** 0.085** 0.084**  0.084** 
 (0.468) (0.462)  (0.463) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.042) 
Olson-type_Only_Out 0.848 0.870 0.852  (0.125)** 0.124** 0.124***  
 (0.540) (0.538) (0.540)  (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)  
Putnam-type_&_Olson-type_Out -0.083  -0.051  0.038  0.039  
 (0.645)  (0.636)  (0.049)  (0.046)  
Putnam-type_&_Residual_Out 1.186**   1.174** 0.081**   0.084** 
 (0.469)   (0.461) (0.039)   (0.038) 
Olson-type_&_Residual_Out -0.035 -0.043   0.017 0.018   
 (0.622) 0.618)   (0.056) (0.055)   
All_Types_Out 0.808*    0.042    
 (0.481)    (0.061)    
At_Least_One_Putnam-type_Out  0.893**     0.050   
  (0.354)     (0.032)   
At_Least_One_Residual_Out   0.954***     0.069**  
   (0.343)     (0.031)  
At_Least_One_Olson-type_Out    0.496     0.075** 
    (0.374)     (0.034) 
Dropout -0.228 -0.225 -0.230 -0.230 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.511) (0.504) (0.503) (0.505) (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
Table 6 (continued)         
Amount sent     0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Amount sent Square     -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.534** -0.475* -0.525** -0.545** -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 -0.040 
 (0.259) (0.254) (0.255) (0.259) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Age 0.154** 0.151** 0.140** 0.149** 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.0701) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age Squared -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.00167** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000740) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income_dissatisfaction -0.570* -0.606** -0.610** -0.595** 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.015 
 (0.292) (0.290) (0.291) (0.291) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) 
South -1.077*** -1.166*** -1.087*** -1.097*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.106*** 
 (0.379) (0.365) (0.370) (0.369) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) 
Town-size 0.127 0.150 0.106 0.0952 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.022 
 (0.239) (0.232) (0.238) (0.239) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Bachelor’s_degree 0.624* 0.559 0.579 0.544 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.358) (0.358) (0.355) (0.343) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Secondary_school 0.326 0.248 0.322 0.279 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.009 
 (0.293) (0.284) (0.297) (0.288) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Retired 0.268* 0.308 0.289 0.314 -0.074* -0.076* -0.073* -0.070* 
 (0.379) (0.375) (0.374) (0.374) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Unemployed -1.186 -1.132* -1.125 -1.133 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.033 
 (0.690) (0.683) (0.684) (0.711) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
Family_size -0.112 -0.119 -0.108 -0.117 -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.0741) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unmarried -0.506 -0.409 -0.483 -0.471 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 -0.028 
 (0.355) (0.343) (0.352) (0.349) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Only_Child -0.135 -0.117 -0.154 -0.136 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.274) (0.274) (0.283) (0.280) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
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Believer -0.992*** -0.927*** -0.960*** -0.976*** -0.043 -0.041 -0.041 0.041 
 (0.333) (0.328) (0.327) (0.331) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Table 6 (continued)         
Practicing 0.348 0.386 0.398 0.347 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.034 
 (0.306) (0.307) (0.306) (0.301) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Divorced 0.033 0.012 -0.040 0.0844 -0.018 -0.015 -0.021 -0.007 
 (0.611) (0.605) (0.572) (0.584) (0.090) (0.093) (0.090) (0.094) 
Health_satisfaction 0.047 0.060 0.061 0.0662 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 
 (0.152) (0.153) (0.156) (0.153) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Risfin 0.084 0.087 0.087* 0.0878* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.0527) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Mistakes -0.009 -0.022 -0.011 -0.0151 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.078) (0.0764) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Experimenter 0.375 0.400* 0.384* 0.371 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 
 (0.230) (0.229) (0.223) (0.229) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Other_Associations -1.397* -1.108* -1.391** -1.429** 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.730) (0.643) (0.636) (0.697) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053) 
Constant Constants  Constants  Constants Constants  -0.235 -0.213 -0.220 -0.209 
 omitted omitted omitted omitted (0.161) (0.158) (0.150) (0.155) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 1914 1914 1914 1914 
Pseudo R2 0.0967 0.0930 0.0936 0.0940     
sigma_u     0.159 0.159 0.160 0.160 
sigma_e     0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
chi2     431.8 438.1 458.6 424.9 
Notes: Putnam-type_Ing, Residual_Ing and Olson-type_Ing identifies subjects involved in the in-group treatment and recruited in Putnam-type, Residual and Olson-type 
associations respectively. Variables denoted by X_Only_Out, X={Putnam-type, Residual, Olson-type} identify subjects who are members of type of association X in the out-group 
treatment. X1_&_ X2_Out, X1= X; X2=X; identify subjects who, in the out-group treatment, are members of both association types X1 & X2 , but are not member of the third 
association type, where X1 and X2 identify different types. For instance, Putnam-type_&_Residual_Out identifies members who belong to at least one Putnam-type association, at 
least one Residual association, but are not members of Olson-type associations. All_Types_Out identifies subjects who are members of all three types of association in the out-
group treatment. Finally, At_Least_One_X_Out identifies subjects who are members of at least one association of type X. For instance, At_Least_One_Olson-type_Out includes the 
four categories: {Olson-type_Only_Out; Olson-type_&_Putnam-type_Out; Olson-type_&_Residual_Out; All_Types_Out}. Robust standard errors (columns 1,2,3, and 4) and 
bootstrapped standard errors generated in 1000 repetitions (columns 5,6,7, and 8) are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Appendix A for the description 
of the control variables included in the regressions. 
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Finally, we analyze if the intensity of participation in different types of associations has an effect on trusting 
and trustworthy behavior of members. We consider the number of hours actually spent volunteering with 
associations and the number of associations joined by members. In both cases, we include in the 
regressions the dummy variables identifying membership in the different types of associations. Indeed, the 
coefficients of the variables measuring the intensity effect reveal the effect of the intensity net of the effect 
of the mere participation. 
First we focus on the number of hours spent volunteering with associations of different types (defined as 
Hours). In regard with subjects involved in the in-group treatment, we considered the number of hours 
spent in the associations where they had been recruited. This was a natural choice, since these associations 
are those used to create the in-group condition (see section 3). With respect to subjects in the out-group 
condition, we restricted the analysis to members who belong strictly to one type of association. In fact, in 
case of members belonging to more than one association type, we are not able to impute the hours spent 
volunteering to the type of association where these have been spent
11
. The number of hours spent 
volunteering is never significant when we consider subjects in the in-group treatment belonging to the 
three different types of associations (Hours_ Putnam-type_Ing, Hours_ Residual_Ing, Hours_ Olson-
type_Ing) (Table 7, column 1). In the out-group treatment, the number of hours is not significant either for 
Putnam-type (Hours_ Putnam-type_Only_Out, p=0.103) or for Residual associations (Hours_ 
Residual_Only_Out) (p=0.420), but has a negative and significant effect for Olson-type associations (Hours_ 
Olson-type_Only_Out) (p=0.022) (Table 7, column 1). 
As for the relationship between Hours and members behavior when acting as Receiver, we do not detect 
any significant effect (Table 7, column 2).  
A second analysis related to the intensity of the associational life, reveals that the number of associations 
joined by members (Number_ Putnam-type_Out, Number_ Residual_Out, Number_ Olson-type_Out) does 
not affect the amounts sent (Table 8, column 1). 
As for return rates, we do not detect any significant effect of number of associations on trustworthiness in 
this case, either (Table 8, column 2).  
In conclusion, we do not find evidence of a clear effect of intensity of participation on the level of trust and 
trustworthiness of members of different types of associations. We only find an effect of the intensity of 
participation in relation to the number of hours spent volunteering in associations, showing a negative 
effect of the number of hours spent volunteering on trust of members of Olson-type associations when 
they are paired with people from the general public. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11
 Asking the number of hours spent volunteering in each association would have of course been interesting, but the overall length 
of the questionnaire prevented us from doing that.  
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Table 7 - Analysis of amounts sent and return rates: Effects of length of hours spent in association per week 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Amount sent Return rate 
Hours_ Putnam-type_Ing 0.002 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.000) 
Hours_ Residual_Ing 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Hours_ Olson-type_Ing -0.013 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.001) 
Hours_ Putnam-type_Out -0.296 -0.007 
 (0.182) (0.039) 
Hours_ Residual_Out -0.068 -0.006 
 (0.084) (0.006) 
Hours_ Olson-type_Out -0.235** 0.002 
 (0.102) (0.019) 
Putnam-type_Ing 1.139 0.004 
 (0.946) (0.083) 
Residual_Ing 1.539*** 0.174*** 
 (0.547) (0.063) 
Olson-type_Ing 2.599*** -0.014 
 (0.631) (0.085) 
Putnam-type_Only_Out 2.212 0.007 
 (1.473) (0.172) 
Residual_Only_Out 1.258 0.071 
 (0.899) (0.057) 
Olson-type_Only_Out 1.896*** 0.107 
 (0.659) (0.065) 
Dropout -0.426 -0.033 
 (0.528) (0.041) 
Amount sent  0.030*** 
  (0.002) 
Amount sent Square  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Female -0.722** -0.061** 
 (0.320) (0.030) 
Age 0.067 0.004 
 (0.092) (0.009) 
Age Squared -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Income_dissatisfaction -0.323 0.019 
 (0.318) (0.040) 
South -1.109*** -0.131*** 
 (0.404) (0.040) 
Town-size -0.046 0.039 
 (0.274) (0.027) 
Table 7 (continued)   
Bachelor’s_degree 1.119*** 0.040 
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 (0.407) (0.046) 
Secondary_school 0.562 0.051 
 (0.369) (0.040) 
Retired  0.048*** -0.126* 
 (0.534) (0.068) 
Unemployed -2.166 -0.048 
 (0.716) (0.075) 
Family_size -0.139 -0.023* 
 (0.135) (0.012) 
Unmarried -0.668 -0.035 
 (0.444) (0.033) 
Only_Child -0.057 0.035 
 (0.299) (0.034) 
Believer -1.439*** -0.070** 
 (0.381) (0.032) 
Practicing 0.884** 0.031 
 (0.344) (0.034) 
Divorced -0.397 0.009 
 (0.707) (0.113) 
Health_satisfaction 0.254 0.022 
 (0.183) (0.021) 
Risfin 0.079 -0.011** 
 (0.062) (0.005) 
Mistakes  -0.009 0.023** 
 (0.094) (0.010) 
Experimenter 0.155 0.033 
 (0.270) (0.025) 
Constant Constants  -0.108 
 omitted (0.211) 
Observations 232 1392 
Pseudo R2 0.1299  
sigma_u  0.161 
sigma_e  0.132 
chi2  411.2 
Notes: see Table 6. Variables whose name starts with “Hours” measure the number of hours per week spent volunteering in the 
type of association specified by the variable name. For example, Hours_ Olson-type_Out measures the number of hours spent 
volunteering per week in Olson-type associations by members involved in the out-group treatment. Robust standard errors 
(column 1) and bootstrapped standard errors generated in 1000 repetitions (column 2) are reported in parentheses; ***; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We omitted the variable Other_Associations because of problems of multi-collinearity. See Appendix A 
for the description of all the control variables included in the regressions. 
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Table 8 - Analysis of amounts sent and return rates: Effects of number of joined associations 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
 Amount sent 
Return rate 
 
Putnam-type_Ing 1.034*** 0.039 
 (0.387) (0.037) 
Residual_Ing 1.746*** 0.169*** 
 (0.431) (0.047) 
Olson-type_Ing 1.778*** 0.115** 
 (0.492) (0.049) 
Number_ Putnam-type_Out -0.099 -0.051 
 (0.465) (0.033) 
Number_ Residual_Out 0.145 0.023 
 (0.160) (0.021) 
Number_ Olson-type_Out 0.025 0.051 
 (1.013) (0.068) 
Putnam-type_Only_Out 1.388* 0.090 
 (0.814) (0.069) 
Residual_Only_Out 0.980* 0.051 
 (0.591) (0.053) 
Olson-type_Only_Out 0.822 0.062 
 (1.267) (0.086) 
Putnam-type_&_Olson-type_Out 0.007 0.039 
 (1.165) (0.107) 
Putnam-type_&_Residual_Out 1.139 0.132* 
 (1.064) (0.074) 
Olson-type_&_Residual_Out -0.236 -0.070 
 (1.490) (0.101) 
All_Types_Out 0.726 0.039 
 (1.524) (0.127) 
Dropout -0.230 0.001 
 (0.511) (0.046) 
Amount sent  0.029*** 
  (0.002) 
Amount sent Square  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Female -0.533** -0.038 
 (0.259) (0.025) 
Age 0.152** 0.008 
 (0.072) (0.006) 
Age Squared -0.002** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Income_dissatisfaction -0.578** 0.011 
 (0.294) (0.031) 
South -1.075*** -0.101*** 
 (0.381) (0.032) 
Table 8 (continued)   
 24 
Town-size 0.126 0.028 
 (0.239) (0.021) 
Bachelor’s_degree 0.620* -0.008 
 (0.356) (0.034) 
Secondary_school 0.327 0.010 
 (0.295) (0.030) 
Retired  0.269 -0.070 
 (0.388) (0.043) 
Unemployed -1.187* 0.033 
 (0.704) (0.062) 
Family_size -0.112 -0.014* 
 (0.075) (0.008) 
Unmarried -0.496 -0.025 
 (0.363) (0.027) 
Only_Child -0.148 0.001 
 (0.275) (0.028) 
Believer -0.967*** -0.036 
 (0.345) (0.027) 
Practicing 0.348 0.039 
 (0.306) (0.026) 
Divorced 0.047 -0.010 
 (0.619) (0.089) 
Health_satisfaction 0.042 0.019 
 (0.156) (0.017) 
Risfin 0.085 -0.005 
 (0.054) (0.006) 
Mistakes  -0.012 0.017** 
 (0.080) (0.008) 
Experimenter 0.368 0.032 
 (0.231) (0.022) 
Other_Associations -1.396* -0.002 
 (0.767) (0.052) 
Constant  -0.229 
  (0.156) 
Observations 319 1914 
Pseudo R2 0.0971  
sigma_u  0.158 
sigma_e  0.148 
chi2  475.5 
Notes: see Table 6. Variables whose name starts with “Number” measure the number of associations of the type specified by the 
variable name joined by the subject. For example, Number_Putnam-type_Out measures the number of Putnam-type associations 
joined by subjects involved in the out-group treatment. Robust standard errors (column 1) and bootstrapped standard errors 
generated in 1000 repetitions (column 2) are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Appendix A for the 
description of the control variables included in the regressions.  
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5. Conclusions 
Putnam’s hypothesis on the positive effect of associational participation on spirit of cooperation conflicts 
with Olson’s hypothesis, which sees voluntary groups as pursuing private interests and setting up activities 
conducive to rent-seeking behavior. The existing empirical literature, based on survey data, provides only 
mixed evidence that is not conclusive on the Putnam vs. Olson debate. Moreover, the lack of experimental 
studies on this issue is particularly critical, since survey questions on trust and cooperative behavior are 
characterized by commonly recognized interpretative problems. By distinguishing between different types 
of associations, we provide the first experimental analysis on trust and trustworthiness of members of 
Putnam-type and Olson-type associations when paired with fellow members and with people from the 
general population and we compare members’ behavior with that of non-members. 
First, we find that members of Putnam-type associations trust people from the general public significantly 
more than non-members. Moreover, they do not discriminate between fellow members and people from 
the general population. The latter result opens interesting questions for further research revealing that 
direct and indirect reciprocity, reputation and sanctioning, which should have a specific effect on spirit of 
cooperation within associations, are not relevant when Putnam-type associations are considered. Second, 
members of Olson-type associations trust people from the general population in the same way as non-
members do. Moreover, they trust fellow members more than people from the general population.  
As far as receivers’ behavior is concerned, we note that members of Olson-type associations return 
significantly more than non-members, both when they are paired with fellow Olson-type members, and 
when they are matched with people from the general public, and without in-group effect. Conversely, 
Putnam-type association members are no more trustworthy than people from the general population, 
either when they are paired with fellow members or when they interact with people from the general 
population. This is a particularly original and interesting result. It highlights that membership in different 
types of associations may be associated with patterns of behavior that vary significantly when different 
motivational drivers are analyzed. It also indirectly confirms previous evidence that different models must 
explain trust and trustworthiness (Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Sapienza et al., 2013). 
We also show that the intensity of participation presents only a significant effect. In particular, we find a 
negative effect of the number of hours spent volunteering in the associations on trusting behavior of 
members of Olson-type association when paired with people from the general public. This is consistent 
with the idea that social relationships in Olson-type associations lead primarily to “bonding” rather than 
“bridging” social capital (Putnam, 2000). 
Finally, we analyze behavior of members of Residual associations with respect to the Olson vs. Putnam 
distinction. As members of Putnam-type associations, these subjects trust people from the general public 
significantly more than non-members. However, as members of Olson-type association, they trust fellow 
members more than people from the general population. When acting as receivers, members of Residual 
associations behave as Olson-type members. No significant effect of the intensity of participation on 
members of Residual associations emerges. 
Our contrasting evidence on the behavior of members of Putnam-type and Olson-type associations when 
acting as sender or receiver in a Trust Game experiment opens interesting questions for further research. 
How do members of different types of association behave when the context of interaction does not ask 
mainly for trust but for other types of motivational driver? In this perspective, it would be useful to 
replicate experimental analysis involving associational members in different games, such as Public Good 
Games, Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 – Variables description 
 
Age Subject’s age 
Female Dummy Variable (DV) taking value one (=1) if the respondent is a female 
Dropout DV=1 if the respondent had been member of an association in the past 
Income_dissatisfaction 
 
 
 
DV=1 if the answer to the questions “How well would you say that you are doing 
financially these days?” is “Living in a comfortable way”. Other possible answers: “Living 
in an acceptable way”; “Barely getting by”; “It goes really badly” 
Town_size DV=1 if the town where the respondent lives has more than 100.000 inhabitants 
South DV =1 if the respondent was born in the South of Italy 
Bachelor’s_degree DV =1 if the respondent has a university degree or higher title 
Secondary_school 
 
 
DV=1 if the respondent has attained high-school diploma (“Maturità” or “Licenza” in the 
Italian education system) as their highest educational achievement. 
Retired DV=1 if the respondent is retired 
Unenmployed DV=1 if the respondent is unemployed 
Family_size Number of family members 
Unmarried DV=1 if the respondent is single 
Only_child DV=1 if the respondent is an only child 
Believer DV=1 if the respondent states s/he is not atheist nor agnostic 
Practicing 
 
DV=1 if the respondent is a church-goer, i.e. s/he attends religious services at least once 
a month 
Divorced DV=1 if the respondent is divorced 
Health_satisfaction DV=1 if the respondent declares to be very satisfied with his/her health condition 
Risfin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
variable measuring the general willingness of the respondent in taking financial risk (it 
takes integer values from 1 to 10). We used the measure of risk aversion based on a 
question in the survey (Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or 
do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 
means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and 10: ‘fully prepared to take risk’), which proved to be 
a good measure of risk aversion (see Dohmen et al., 2011). 
Mistakes Numbers of mistakes in the experiment comprehension test 
Experimenter 
 
dummy variable which distinguishes between the two experimenters who conducted all 
the experimental sessions 
Other_Associations 
 
11 members were inadvertently recruited by Demoskopea, and classified as belonging 
to “other associations” (see footnote 8). 
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